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• 
SUMMARY OF PETITIONER HARRISON'S REPLY TO 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION RESPONSE BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
A. NO LIABILIY EXISTS FOR MOULTON'S WAGES UNDER 
ASSOCIATION ARGUMENT UNDER U.C.A. §34-28-2 
The Respondent/ Appellee the Utah Labor Commission (the 
"Commissioner") appears to argue that the Petitioners/ Appellants Integrita, 
LLC, Wendy Harrison & Design-Build Solutions, LLC (collectively 
"Harrison" and separately "Integrita," Wendy Harrison or "DBS") argument 
"misses the point" and argues that U. CA. §34-28-2 does not require "that 
the employees working for an unincorporated business organization that is 
not a separate legal entity must be employed by the association as opposed 
to the persons who created the association." [ Arg. Pg 11 Appellee BriefJ 
The Commissioner is incorrect in claiming that U. CA. §34-28-2 does 
not require that the employee must be hired by the association in order to 
hold Harrison liable for Moulton' s wages as members of an association. 
U. CA. §34-28-2 does require that the association itself had to employ 
Moulton in order to create liability of the association and its members. The 
Utah Supreme Comt concurs. The Utah Supreme Court in Heaps v. 
Nuriche, LLC, 345 P.3d 655 at ,I14, 2015 UT 26 stated, "The statutory 
definition of employer includes 'every person, firm, partnership, association, 
corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this state, and any agent or 
officer of any of the above-mentioned classes, employing any person in this 
state.' UTAH CODE§ 34-28-2(1)(c) (emphasis added). While the phrase 
'agent or officer of any of the above-mentioned classes' encompasses a large 
group of individuals, that phrase is narrowed by the last clause of the 
definition. The last clause-' employing any person in this state '-modifies 
each of the terms in the preceding list. Thus, the statute limits the definition 
of employer to one who employs." 
Harrison may have incorrectly assumed that the Trial Court concluded 
that the association between Integrita and TJ Enterprises & Acoustical, Inc. 
("TJ Enterprises") operated under a common name, "lntegrita." This 
assumption may have been in error as the Trial Court does not expressly 
state th.is conclusion, but kind of suggested a common name when it stated 
that the contracts with Horizon Retail & Construction, Inc. ("Horizon") were 
in the name of Integrita and "all work was carried on in that name." (See 
bottom of page 8, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711-
726]). Arguably this is incorrect as Horizon was also a party to the contracts 
and as the general contractor, "all of the work" would have been perfo1med 
under its name as well. There was no common name for any association. 
2 
The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed the issue whether there is 
a culpable association. In Weber County v. Ogden Trece, 2013 UT 62, 321 
P.3d 1067 (Utah 2013) the Utah Supreme ruled that criminal gangs can be 
sued as an association under URCP Rule 17(d). This Rule demonstrates that 
there are two requisites for suit to be filed against an association. First 
requisite is where two or more persons conduct business and the second 
requisite is such business is under a common name of the association. 
(Emphasis added) See URCP Rule 17(d) and Weber County v. Ogden Trece, 
138, id. This is supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in BYU v 
Tremco, 110 P.3d 678,684 (Utah 2005). The Court explained at 117, "Rule 
l 7(d) is procedural, not substantive. It contemplates a situation where a 
plaintiff brings suit against two or more associates that have joined together 
under a common name to transact business. By its plain language, [3] rule 
17 ( d) provides that an unincorporated association may be sued under the 
name used by the collective associates to carry out their business. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 17(d)." The Court in BYUv Tremco, id. at 684119 found that 
BYU's argument to find Tremco and others liable under a theory they were 
an unincorporated association failed since there was no common name of the 
alleged association and furthem10re because they did not sue this alleged 
association under a common name. 
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In this case we do not have an "association" because we do not have a 
business operating under a common name. Our argument was and is that 
there has to be a common name before there is a culpable association and 
then in order to find the association liable [ and its members] it must be the 
employer. In this case it was stipulated by the parties that Ted Gurule hired 
Scott Moulton. See page 2 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order, Stipulated Facts No. 3 [711-726] It is important to note that even if 
there were an association under a common name, the fact that it did not 
employ Moulton negates liability of such association under U. CA. §34-28-2. 
Since the Commissioner claims that Petitioners were part of an 
association that employed Moulton, it should also· be pointed out that the 
Trial Court determined that the members of the association were Integrita, 
LLC dba Design-Build Solutions and TJ Enterprises, not Ted Gurule or 
Wendy Harrison or Design-Build Solutions, LLC. See pages 8-9 Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711-726]. 
B. NO LIABILIY EXISTS FOR MOULTON'S WAGES UNDER JOINT 
VENTURE ARGUMENT 
We disagree with the Commissioner's assertion that sharing of losses 
is not a deciding factor in determining whether there is as a joint venture or 
whether there is not a joint venture. We addressed the issue as the Trial 
4 
Court presented this as a factor evidencing a joint venture. It is instructive to 
note that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact appear on their face as 
demonstrating that there was no sharing of losses. Integrita may separately 
incur a loss related to defective work under the Horizon contracts; whereas, 
this did not fall on TJ Enterprises. TJ Enterprises on the other hand would 
have been solely liable for labor expenses exceeding income. See page 11 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711-726]. The Utah 
Supreme Court made it clear that sharing of losses was one of the essential 
elements of a joint venture, unless there was an agreement to the contrary. 
In this case there was no evidence or anything presented evidencing a 
contrary agreement. See Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v 51-SPR-L.L.C., 
183 P .3d 248 at 1 16 (UT 2008) "The only element at issue in this appeal is 
the fifth element: a duty to share in the losses. The duty to share losses is an 
important element of a joint venture. Indeed, loss sharing is a critical 
distinction between an investment-type relationship-in which the first four 
elements may be present, but investors have no duty to share in the losses 
beyond the amount of their investment-and a joint venture relationship. For 
this reason, 'a contract not to share losses weighs heavily against pa1inership 
because it is so inconsistent with the standard partnership form.' Bromberg 
and Ribstein on Partnership, § 2.07(d)(2) (Supp.2006); see also McCulley 
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Fine Arts Gallery, Inc. v. 'X" Partners, 860 S.W.2d 473,479 
(Tex.Ct.App.1993) ('Generally, the absence of a provision to share losses 
indicates the lack of intent to create a partnership.')." 
As for the statement made by the Commission "That they agreed to 
different measures as to how much of the profit each should receive does not 
alter the fact that they each had a right to share the profit." If the proceeds 
from Horizon exceeded the cost of labor, materials and Integrita's 2 1/2% 
fixed income, that would amount to profit. 1 Harrison was not entitled to 
any portion or share of this profit as it all went TJ Gurule under the TJ 
Enterprise name. See page 6 ,I21, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order [711-726]. Therefore, as a matter of fact there was no sharing of 
profit. 
As for relying on Vern Shutte & Sons v J.R. Broadbent, 473 P.2d 885 
(Utah 1970) "being misplaced," Harrison disagrees. This is still good Utah 
law and well cited case for the following point of Utah law: The Utah 
Supreme Court at page 886 stated, "In summary we see that in order to 
create a joint adventure it is not enough that the parties act in concert to 
achieve some economic objective. The ultimate inquiry is whether the 
1 
"A common definition for 'profits' is 'the excess of returns over 
expenditures in a transaction or series of transactions."' Penelko, Inc. v. John 
Price Assoc., 642 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Utah 1982), ref. Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary (1 st Ed. 1973). 
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parties manifested by their conduct a desire to commingle their profits, 
control, and risks in achieving the objective. * * * An agreement, express or 
implied, for the sharing of profits among the coventurers is indispensable· to 
the creation of the joint venture; and the profit accruing must be joint and 
not several." (ref Williston on Contracts [3d Ed.], §318A, p. 571). The 
Supreme Court went on to state, "The California court observed that 
although the profits of each of the two participating corporate entities were 
dependent on the overall success of the project, neither was to share in the 
profits or losses that the other might realize or suffer. Although each 
received substantial payments, neither had an interest in the payments 
received by the other. The court concluded that under these circumstances 
no joint venture existed. In the instant action, the undisputed evidence 
indicated that the profits accruing to either party to the Broadbent-
Fredrickson contract were several and not joint. Under such circumstances 
the cattle feeding transaction was not, as a matter of law, a joint venture." 
In this case Harrison had absolutely no interest in the profit, if any, 
received by Ted Gurule and TJ Enterprises and they in tum had no interest 
in the fixed income received by Haffison. Therefore, Harrison contends that 
as a matter of law no joint venture exists in this case. 
7 
C. Wendy Harrison is not Personally Liable for Moulton's 
Unpaid Wages. 
The Commissioner contends that "Harrison held herself out as the 
agent of the association and is liable for unpaid wages." The Trial Court on 
the other hand concluded that Wendy Harrison was personally liable to 
Moulton pursuant to U.C.A. §34-28-2 because she was an officer of Integrita 
and therefore an agent of the joint venture. The Utah Supreme Court was 
clear that an agent is not held personally liable, unless such individual 
personally hired the employee. There was never any evidence presented that 
indicated that Wendy Harrison personally employed Moulton and as such 
she is not liable under Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, 345 P.3d 655 at ,I14, 2015 UT 
26. The Utah Supreme Court made it clear at 118, "In summary, we hold that 
Managers are not personally liable under the UPW A because they did not 
personally employ Employees. Instead, Managers were acting as agents of 
Nuriche." 
The Commissioner supports his theory that Wendy Harrison as agent 
of the association is liable for Moulton's unpaid wages, Citing Grazer v 
Jones, 2012 UT 58, ,II 1,289 P.3d 437. However, whether she was an agent 
with actual authority or as the Commissioner suggests, an agent with 
apparent authority does not change the Heaps v. Nuriche, LLC, id. 
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D. MOULTON NOT THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER 
INTEGRITA'S CONTRACTS AND LIEN WAIVERS WITH HORIZON 
The Commissioner's argument is fatally flawed in that the Commissioner 
cites as his authority for arguing the Contract between Integrita and Horizon 
expressly provides for Moulton' s wages, is the contract language used by the 
Court at page 14, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order [711-
726]. The language used by the Court is not the language actually found in 
the contract itself. [See Stipulated Exhibits 2, 3 & 4]. Although we recited 
the contract verbatim in the Appellants' Brief, it is worthy of again setting 
forth herein, as a reading of such will dispel any notion that such indemnity 
agreement expressly or even remotely makes Moulton a third-party 
beneficiary entitled to receive unpaid wages. This indemnification provision 
of the Contracts between Integrita and Horizon states, "To the fullest extent 
permitted by law, the Subcontractor shall defend, indemnify and hold 
harmless the Contractor, Landlord, Tenant and the Owner, their agents, 
consultants, and employees from any and all claims for bodily injury and 
property damage that may arise from the performance of the Subcontractors 
Work or anyone employed directly or indirectly by any of them or by 
anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable" 
9 
The Commissioner does not provide any argument or legal authority 
in supp01i of his position that Harrison are liable for Moulton's unpaid 
wages because a lawsuit was settled between Horizon and Integrita. 
CONCLUSION 
Harrison respectfully prays that this Court reverse the Order of the 
Trial Court for the following reasons: 
1. The Trial Court applied U. C.A. §34-28-2 to declare that TJ 
Enterprises and Integrita formed an association which in tum employed 
Moulton. However, Ted Gurule employed Moulton. Therefore, under this 
statute an association did not hire Moulton and Integrita is not liable for 
Moulton's wages. 
Since the alleged association does not operate under a common name, 
there is no basis to assign liability thereunder. 
2. There was no joint venture as a matter of law as there was no 
sharing of profits or of losses. 
3. Wendy Harrison was not personally liable for Moulton's unpaid 
wages under UC.A. §34-28-2 because she did not personally employ 
Moulton. 




the contracts and lien waivers between Horizon and Integrita and therefore 
not entitled to unpaid wages from Integrita. 
Dated this 26th day of February, 2016. 
David E. Ross II 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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